In early June, after three years of debate and revision, the National Assembly passed the South African Defence Review. Spanning several hundred pages and authored by a varied and intelligent group, the Defence Review can be objectively termed a ‘good’ piece of legislation for the defence force. In a nutshell, the review effectively plots the way forward for the defence force, plucking it out of the horribly-structured cost-saving shell it was encased in and paving a useful and constructive foundation upon which to develop. The paper covers everything from the country’s foreign policy interests, to its defence force responsibilities, and the economic implications to civilians and industry alike for this new force design.
Naturally, as the review was passed so began the criticism. Despite there being a multi-year consultation period and many pages of addenda included in the new defence review, the criticism of scope and scale constantly emerge. David Maynier, the Aemocratic Alliance shadow minister for defence, for example, is concerned about funding questions that linger, as well as the possibility of a new “arms deal” that could emerge. Maynier has called for a revision of the review, despite it being revised constantly. It is unfortunate that attempts to hijack the review are being made just as the engine gets started. The review was not tasked with discussing the much broader political concerns on arms deals, and has an entire chapter dedicated to funding and procurement, written by Helmoed Heitman, one of the country’s foremost military experts.
The 2014 document has designs and strategies for all stages of potential funding, recommends greater procurement transparency, and seeks local investment. Beyond this, the specific force design plans for the SANDF make logical sense for the military South Africa is hoping to create. With the defence review now passed, the dead wood can be cut away and a new force slowly regenerated from the core that remains. Calling for a revision and abandonment now is unhelpful and, frankly, obstructive.
SANDF soldiers board a SAMIL truck while on operations in South Africa – Photo by Trent Perkins
In terms of scale, the SANDF’s role under the new review would expand into that of broader peacekeeping and critical humanitarian assistance when required. This has received scathing criticism by Savo Heleta, who likens the attempt by the SANDF to evolve into humanitarian peacekeepers to that of the United States’ co-opting of NGOs in the Near and Middle East. Heleta strongly believes that any humanitarian involvement by the SANDF would be tantamount to an invasion of the NGO aid sphere. This is bady flawed thinking.
The SANDF is not seeking to replace NGOs with its own uniformed version of aid workers. It is correct to observe that the SANDF lacks the skills to be immunologists, development economists and migration trackers. What is incorrect is assuming that the SANDF seeks to take these roles on. A quick visit to the peace mission training facility at the Army College in Centurion would show this. The SANDF’s intentions lie more in working to provide a first-response type of humanitarianism. A rapid intervention followed by bridge repair and basic medical aid, for example, versus the creation of refugee camps and organisation of engineering works.
The SANDF is learning, and should learn, how to act as humanitarians. The Army includes engineers, doctors and water treatment experts. Leaving them in base because it might tread on an NGO’s budgetary toes in the combing months of stabilisation operations is the kind of thinking befitting a conscript army, not a professional, specialised force envisioned in the defence review.
The defence review has a firm grasp on what capabilities the defence force ought to have in order to fulfil the South African foreign policy of the future. Reactions to the paper’s passing in National Assembly are premature. As much of a battle as it was to get the review passed in the first place, the real struggle to implement it now awaits. There will be ample time for the detractors to snipe from the barricades while this process continues. For now, it is encouraging to see a rapid shift in the SANDF’s language during briefings to align with the defence review. “Arresting the decline” appears to be so much of a defence buzzword in the past two weeks that it may well become a new drinking game in the officers’ mess.
The notion that the SANDF should adhere to an old, dysfunctional stereotype, both financially and operationally, is wrongheaded. The use of the military as a blunt instrument is not an optimal use of a large group of trained personnel able to do a range of tasks in dangerous places. The Bush Wars are over, and it’s time to start planning for a military that can be used as a multi-role tool rather than a blunt instrument of force.
As mentioned before, there is no plan B for the defence review if it is not funded. This alone makes the importance of stretching the troops’ capabilities paramount. Procurement concerns and the threat to NGOs’ ability to conduct humanitarian activities are being made far too early in the process. Rather, eyes should be on the current gradual integration of the review into the various services of the SANDF. Far more critical now is the review’s legitimacy in the eyes of the SANDF’s epaulet-wearing caretakers.
Thanks for this John. Are you still involved with Daily Maverick? If so, why not get them to run this as a counter to Heleta’s?
By the way where can one access your draft wargame on the Battle of Bangui?
Hi Jean. I am indeed. Still doing the first thing. I might send it through to them for republication.
My war game is in an archive at kings war studies, but I have intentions of reprinting the materials! All the content is still stored with me.
That poor old wargame is now likely gathering dust on my Consim lecturer’s shelf at King’s. That said I have a strong intention to re-print the material again. It’s all still stored on the pc.
I would not mind reading it over if you reprint it.
Just Done would happily publish it for you!
Can Heleta’s NGOs, noble and competent as they are, repair a bridge collapsed by an earthquake? Maybe a few of them can, in a few months. Meanwhile a properly funded, equipped and mandated army has the ability to install a temporary bridge in a matter of hours. NGOs take up to a week just to organise a charter flight to a disaster area – a properly funded, equipped and mandated air force can take-off within hours.
That’s the thing, there are certain roles in humanitarian disaster response that NGOs and other humanitarian agencies simply cannot fulfil, because they lack the capacity and skill sets.
But most importantly, the humanitarian work envisioned in the DR is the same sort of thing the SANDF has been doing since its formation: Digging wells, repairing bridges, providing basic medical help, etc, which are all attempts to alleviate short-term problems, not long-term conditions. There’s neither the ability nor the desire to perform the type of long-term humanitarian work that MSF and other NGOs do.
I do understand the foundation of Heleta’s concern, given that there can be danger in blurring the lines between militaries and humanitarian organisations, not least because if you’re not careful you can make NGOs targets too. But Heleta gets it wrong in assuming that there has to be an absolute distinction and that militaries cannot perform any ‘hearts and minds’ work, which is ludicrous. First, because pretty much every professional military has incorporated some level of humanitarian work into their doctrine for decades, including the SANDF which has performed humanitarian work on virtually every single foreign deployment since 1994. And second, because the examples of the UN (in having military peacekeeping and humanitarian arms) and other conflicts where the independence of NGOs has been carefully respected there has been no problem.
This is much ado about nothing. In truth, the DR’s discussion of humanitarian work is merely a continuation of current SANDF policy and does not represent anything new. There’s no need to get worked up about it.
As far as I know, the largest globally active humanitarian NGO in SA, Gift of the Givers, actually has a very good relationship with the SANDF. They don’t need it to be messed up by the kind of sh#t-stirring Heleta is trying.
Yep. SAAF in particular since SAAF will fly there aid to areas. A perfect example of the military and NGO helping out.
All so this humanitarian work saved lives in CAR. Local people liked the south Africans and aided them in there escape and evasion of Seleka forces.
All so the old SADF did a lot of hearts and minds stuff in Angola.
I agree with you that it’s a perfect example of how the two groups can aid each other.
Strange that you say that because when ever I speak to Angolans they don’t tend to have any fond memories of the SADF.
It really just depends where you go though because
Ok, lets be clear on one thing. Working the “hearts and minds” as the USA is calling it, is nothing new. The SADF has done this extensively in SWA in the so called Bush war times, It was also done in many of the “townships” where the SADF was involved. In SAW/Namibia, the SADF used to run schools and hospitals and served as water supplier to many of the remote areas. In Angola, the SADF supplied lots of food and water to many of the “towns” that fell within a combat zone. I speak from first hand experience. T have battles in these ares would inevitably lead to colatteral or sivilian casualties and wounded. Many an Angolan found themselves “CASAVAC” in a SAAF Puma or Alo, during this time. So, this is not something that started in the SANDF or by the American forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. This has been done by many forces in conflict areas and during natural disasters in many parts of the world.
Having traveled extensively through Namibia years after the Border War, I can’t say that I got positive feedback from people who saw the SADF and SWATF as an occupier, they didn’t sound too positive.
Yes, I remember the SADF used to run schools but the locals still didn’t like us. However it was a great initiative. We all know how township duty went. I don’t think we can accurately say that the SADF and SWATF won the hearts and minds of people.
If one was to ask the average black african on their view was that they did not like them.
I agree it’s always been done but it’s not always possible to win over the majority of people in a country. Yes they could fear us but that does not translate to loyalty
I don’t find it all that surprising, ‘hearts and minds’ is inherently difficult and it can never be divorced from the broader political, military and social factors that are at play in any area of operations. It also goes hand-in-hand with psy-ops.
In the situation the SADF faced there was never a chance of being seen as anything other than an occupying force, at best it could’ve hoped to be seen as a benevolent occupier and better than the other guys. Given the political situation in play, it was always going to be an uphill battle.
On a related note, this is something the SA government needs to keep in mind with regards to our peacekeeping deployments. If the local population ever begin to feel that the South African soldiers are there for anything other than benevolent motives — such as believing that they’re protecting economic interests — the job of winning them over becomes incredibly difficult.
I always try to support GOTG because they seem to have a let’s help everyone attitude and I like their motto as well.
I agree with you that they have a good relationship with the SANDF to the degree that the SANDF chose them to assist undocumented refugees.
I know the GOTG has always asked the SANDF to consider them when getting rid of all equipment so that they can use it on their humanitarian missions.
Imagine if the SAN donated the SAS Drak when they retire it to the GOTG to use as a hospital or aid ship. It would go a long way to show that the SANDF cares about humanitarian aid.
Very true, and the bridge is just one element. The military could help set up medical sites, establish communication, field kitchens, clear rubble, provide fire fighters, extra extra far faster than any NGO.
Exactly. View the response to any major natural disaster and it’s usually military transport planes flying in supplies, military helicopters rescuing survivors, etc.
I just skimmed the DR again for all mentions of humanitarian aid. It’s very clear that the context is primarily around disaster relief.
This paragraph, from page 148, is about as controversial & far-reaching as it gets:
“Humanitarian assistance operations may be necessary when people are facing a severe threat or deprivation and civilian assistance is hampered or prevented. These operations combine the demands of humanitarian assistance operations with stability operations to protect the population, relief teams and their stores, and to ensure free movement and the free distribution of supplies.
31. Defence, as authorised by Government, will use its collateral capabilities to provide rapidly deployable forces to stabilise such situations prior to the deployment of follow-on forces and the humanitarian agencies required to enable and execute relief operations.”
very well written piece. So many of the complaints of the Review now are stupid to be funny. It is like they just complaining because they want to complain. Any case the defence force has been doing many of the things mentioned in the review for years. Just with out the needed budget or support.